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RESPONSES TO SACHS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sachs5 brief contains a number of "facts" that are incomplete, irrelevant and/or 
impermissible legal assertions. Appellants respond to these specific assertions as 
follows: 
Fact No. 4: The principal business of [United Park City Mines Company 
("UPCM")] was the leasing, development and sale of its real property in Utah. See Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, f 7, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, *h 7, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, 
ffi[ 10-11, R. 3-4. 
Appellants' Response: Sachs' assertion is true but incomplete. The principal 
business of UPCM was the leasing, development and sale of its real property in Utah. 
Further, the "real property in Utah"—consisting of the surface estate to more than 8,300 
acres of land in the Park City area (along with entitlements to develop such property)— 
was UPCM's "only asset of any significance whatsoever." (R. at 3, 1115; 1210, 1257.) 
Fact No. 10: Although the specific amount of the finder's fee was not discussed at 
their May 2, 2007 meeting, both Lesser and Sachs understood that Plaintiff Sachs would 
receive a usual and customary finder's fee for his efforts. A usual and customary fee for 
assisting in locating a buyer for a company is 3% of the sale price of the corporation. See 
Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 16, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f 16, R. 1627; Verified 
Complaint, IJH 28-29, R. 6.; Sachs Dep.R. 1357, 1373, at 95:23-96:16; 1384-1386, 145:8-
148:8; 149:15-150:5; Tesch Memo, R. 1484. 
Appellants' Response: Disputed but immaterial to the questions for which 
certiorari was granted. 
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Fact No. 11: Plaintiff Sachs does not have a real estate broker's license and was 
not acting as a broker, but as a professional business finder, in locating a buyer for 
UPCM, a New York Stock Exchange company, in response to Lesser's request. See Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, \ 63, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, \ 63, R. 1634; Sachs Dep. R. 
1357, 1384-1385, 147:20-148:8. 
Appellants' Response: As confessed by Sachs, he does not have a real estate 
broker's license. His assertion regarding "not acting as a broker" is a legal conclusion. 
Fact No. 13: On the morning of May 17, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs delivered a letter to 
Rothwell regarding Sachs' prior introduction of Granite and the finder's fee expected for 
locating a joint venturer or buyer for UPCM, stating 
I write this letter to remind you that I will expect a modest 
finder's fee if an agreement comes to fruition. This could be 
cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or 
some other consideration acceptable to both of us. While I 
believe that we have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I 
do think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the table 
early on, and I hope that you feel the same. Please let me 
know if you have any questions concerning such a finder's 
fee. 
Appellants' Response: Disputed but immaterial to questions presented on appeal. 
Fact No. 22: Lesser agrees that Plaintiff Sachs would have been entitled to a 
finder's fee if Granite had purchased UPCM or if Sachs had located Jackson to purchase 
UPCM, but denies that Plaintiff Sachs found Jackson to purchase UPCM. See Pltf. Mem. 
Op. L&L, fflf 55, 61, R. 1329-1330; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl[ 55, 61, R. 1632-1634; 
Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1411-1412 at 129:6-130:17. 
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Appellants' Response: Disputed but immaterial to questions presented in this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SACHS' ASSERTIONS THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE RAISED NEW 
ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL ARE ERRONEOUS. 
Sachs repeatedly argues that Defendants failed to preserve various arguments set 
forth in their appellate brief. According to Sachs, Defendants are not permitted to 
respond to the Court of Appeals' newly articulated view of the law but are limited to 
rehashing arguments in the summary judgment briefs presented to the trial court. 
Defendants undoubtedly preserved the issue of whether the Utah Real Estate Brokers Act 
("UREBA") encompassed Sachs5 activities in this matter. Defendants are entitled, 
indeed required, to respond to the Court of Appeals' ruling that UREBA does not apply, a 
rationale that Sachs himself did not argue to the Court of Appeals. See Colosimo v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, Tf 11, 156 P.3d 806 ("On 
certiorari review, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision 
of the district court.").1 
The central issue that is presented to this Court is the same issue that was 
presented to both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, namely whether UREBA 
precludes Sachs from recovering a finder's fee. Presenting additional arguments to this 
Moreover, while the parties addressed numerous issues before the Court of Appeals, 
including whether a contract even existed, this Court's grant of certiorari review 
narrowed the issues considerably. As such, Defendants addressed these issues, which 
were preserved below, in more depth in their brief to this Court. 
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Court in support of a position that a party has taken from the outset is not prohibited by 
Tindlev v. Salt Lake City School District 2005 UT 30, 116 R3d 295, or Espinal v. Salt 
Lake City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990). In both Tindley and Espinal 
this Court refused to consider constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, Tf 10 n.2; Espinal 797 P.2d at 413. In both cases, the party 
bringing the constitutional challenge failed to raise the issue in the court below. Those 
cases are easily distinguishable from the present, because Defendants have argued from 
the outset that UREBA applies to Sachs' purported finder's fee agreement. 
This Court has inherent authority to consider any issue on appeal, including issues 
not raised by the parties, Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 
(Utah 1998), and it must consider all information bearing upon the proper interpretation 
of a statute. '"[BJecause issues concerning what a statute means or what a legislature 
intended are essentially issues of fact, even though they are decided by the judge and not 
by a jury, a court should never exclude relevant and probative evidence from 
consideration."5 Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, f 27 n. 4, 
123 P.3d 437 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:02, 
at 14-15 (6th ed. 2000)). Sachs asks this Court to interpret UREBA on the basis of 
incomplete information. However, it is this Court's ultimate responsibility to interpret 
the statute correctly and to consider all evidence relevant to and probative of that 
determination. 
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II. UREBA PRECLUDES SACHS' CLAIMS FOR A FINDER'S FEE 
A, Sachs Was Purportedly Hired to Find a Buyer for UPCM, Not Its 
Stock. 
The linchpin of Sachs' argument to this court is that Defendants purportedly hired 
him to find a buyer—not just for UPCM—but specifically for the Company's capital 
stock. By assuming that the sale of a corporation is the equivalent of—or is always 
accomplished through—the sale of the corporation's stock (see, e.g., Sachs' Br. 15), 
Sachs attempts to turn a purported contract to find a buyer for UPCM into a contract to 
find a buyer for UPCM's stock. However, the record is devoid of evidence supporting 
Sachs' new inference. 
Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Defendants, only 
facts supported by evidence presented in Sachs' summary judgment memoranda, as well 
as reasonable inferences therefrom, may be considered by this Court. Hermansen v. 
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f^ 10, 48 P.3d 235. Sachs' summary judgment briefs are replete 
with references to his purported agreement with Defendants. Although variously 
described, Sachs argued on summary judgment that he was employed to "find" a 
"purchaser" (or "buyer") for "UPCM" (or "the company") (see, e.g., R. at 1604, 1606, 
1608-09, 1612-13, 1618, 1620-24, 1627-34 (Sachs' Opp'n to UPCM's Mot. for Summ. 
J.); R. at 1316, 1318-20, 1323-25, 1327-28, 1330-31 (Sachs' Opp'n to Lesser/Loeb's 
Mot. for Summ. J.)) or, alternatively, to "sell[] the company" (or "sell UPCM") (see, e.g., 
R. at 1615, 1618, 1626, 1629 (Sachs' Opp'n to UPCM's Mot. for Summ. J.); R. at 1317, 
1323 (Sachs' Opp'n to Lesser/Loeb's Mot. for Summ. J.)). Indeed, Sachs never 
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presented any evidence or argument to the trial court in support of his revisionist view 
that he was employed to sell the stock. 
It is axiomatic that a "business can be transferred two ways: the corporation may 
sell all of its assets, then liquidate and distribute to investors the cash received from the 
buyer; or the investors may sell their securities directly to the buyers." Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2004); Snow Country 
Constr. v. Laabs, 989 P.2d 847, 849 (Mont. 1999) ("[T]here is no substantive difference 
between the sale of all of a company's stock and the sale of a company's goodwill in 
some other form."); see also Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The 
transfer of a business can assume many forms, e.g., a sale of assets, including real estate, 
or the transfer of stock." (quoting Kazmer-Standish v. Schoeffel Instruments Corp., 445 
A.2d 1149, 1151 (N.J. 1982))). 
Sachs belatedly argues that because he knew "UPCM was a publicly held 
corporation, [he] could reasonably infer that Capital [Growth Partners'] purchase of 
UPCM would involve the acquisition of 100% of UPCM's outstanding capital stock" 
(Sachs' Br. 39). The evidence in the record on this issue directly refutes Sachs' assertion. 
It is undisputed that the same week Sachs allegedly first contacted Capital Growth 
Partners about purchasing UPCM, an article appeared in the local Park City newspaper 
explaining that UPCM was "exploring strategies to raise money," including "a sale or 
exchange of [UPCM's] capital stock, assets, projects or business to one or more parties." 
(R. at 1619.) Sachs' cites no evidence offered in opposition to Defendants' summary 
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judgment motions to support his subjective, undisclosed assumption that it would be a 
stock sale. 
Sachs' "assumption" that the acquisition would necessarily involve the sale of 
UPCM's capital stock is a carefully crafted position for this appeal that does not accord 
with customary business practices. The parties to a transaction of this type usually do not 
decide whether to transfer a corporation by its stock or its assets until the final 
negotiations because the decision often depends on complex tax considerations and the 
parties' relative bargaining power. See, e.g., Stem v. Bristol Corp., 77 N.Y.S.2d 324, 329 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1948) ("[W]hat the parties had in mind was the purchase and sale of a 
going business; the sale of the certificates of stock was the form which the transaction 
took for tax purposes."); In re Ulupalakua Ranch, Inc., 481 P.2d 612, 614 (Haw. 1971) 
("[T]he form in which the transaction was cast was dictated to a large extent by the 
executor's insistence upon the stock sale as opposed to a sale of the assets."); Stuart A. 
Fredman & Jessica Woodhouse, Tax Considerations in Buying or Selling a Business, in 
Considerations in Buying or Selling a Business in Utah 41-42 (National Business 
Institute 2002) (discussing how the tax consequences of stock sales are generally 
favorable to sellers, whereas asset sales are generally favorable to buyers); Inc.com, 
Buying a Business or Its Assets, Jan. 2002, http://www.inc.com/articles/2002/01/14631.html 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2007) ("Whether you buy corporate shares or its assets instead is a 
crucial choice, because[ i]f you buy only a corporation's assets, you don't assume its 
liabilities, including taxes. . . . [However,] some owners will sell only if the buyer takes 
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corporation stock . . . [because the] seller may have a tax reason for selling stock instead 
of assets."). 
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals' acknowledged, it was Capital Growth Partners 
that "chose to structure its acquisition of UPCM as a stock rather than an asset purchase," 
not Defendants, the parties that allegedly employed Sachs to find a buyer. Sachs v. 
Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, ^ f 51, 163 P.3d 662. If the decision to structure the transaction 
as a stock rather than an asset deal was made by the buyer, then at the time Sachs was 
purportedly employed to find a buyer, no one—including Sachs—knew what form the 
transaction would ultimately assume. 
Thus, despite Sachs' newly disclosed, subjectively held belief about the form of 
the future transaction, the record establishes that no one knew what form the transaction 
would ultimately take. This is pivotal because Sachs (1) claims a commission merely for 
"introducing] the parties who eventually consummated the transaction," and (2) admits 
that the "terms of the sale of UPCM 'were negotiated and concluded without [his] 
involvement'" (Sachs' Br. 16-17).2 At the time Sachs purportedly introduced UPCM and 
Capital Growth Partners' principal, it was quite possible that the transaction would 
involve the sale of UPCM's assets. 
Therefore, Sachs' repeated arguments that the purported finder's "agreement only 
involved the sale of UPCM's stock" (see, e.g., Sachs' Br. 16), as well as all legal 
2
 Sachs admits that finder's agreements are generally subject to UREBA. (Sachs' Br. 
15.) 
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arguments that follow therefrom, rest on an anachronistic view of the facts with no basis 
in the record. Sachs never advanced this argument to the trial court and only does so now 
to take advantage of the Court of Appeals' erroneous interpretation of UREBA. 
B. Sachs Does Not Substantively Dispute Defendants' Plain-Language 
Interpretation of UREBA. 
Without addressing Defendants' plain-language interpretation of the term 
"business opportunities involving real property/' Sachs contends that the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that the phrase was ambiguous because the parties argued 
for differing applications of the phrase. The Court of Appeals, however, placed the cart 
before the horse when it concluded that the phrase was ambiguous because the parties 
urged different applications without first determining whether the phrase could be 
interpreted according to its ordinary, plain meaning. The Court of Appeals failed to 
analyze the ordinary English meaning of the phrase "business opportunities involving 
real property" as required by this Court's clear precedent. See, e.g., Utah State Bar v. 
Summerhaves & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995).3 
Notably, Sachs does not dispute Defendants' plain-language interpretation of the 
phrase, which applies standard dictionary definitions as well as definitions mandated by 
statute, to interpret the phrase. As such, this Court should interpret the term "business 
Sachs' argument that the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" is 
ambiguous because the trial court and the Court of Appeals applied the phrase differently 
underscores the Court of Appeals' error. Because the Court of Appeals failed to construe 
the phrase according to its plain meaning before applying it, the Court of Appeals' 
application is necessarily insufficient. 
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opportunity" according to its ordinary English meaning: "good commercial prospect." 
Although it is true, as Sachs argues, that courts must interpret statutory terms "in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute," Sachs fails to demonstrate how the 
ordinary meaning of the term "business opportunity" contradicts or conflicts with other 
parts of the statute (Sachs5 Br. 21). On the contrary, not only is the plain meaning of the 
term consonant with all other provisions of the statute, it is the only interpretation that 
does not nullify the term. 
C. Sachs' Reliance on an Informal Attorney General Opinion Addressing 
a Different Issue is Misplaced. 
In the event this Court determines that the phrase "business opportunities 
involving real property" is ambiguous, the relevant evidence of legislative intent requires 
this Court to interpret the phrase consistent with the prior statutory definition. 
In contrast, Sachs contends that the prior definition of the term "business 
opportunity" is itself ambiguous, relying upon a 1978 informal opinion from an assistant 
attorney general. Sachs' contention is erroneous for a variety of reasons. 
First, the relevance and rationale of the opinion is dubious because the facts to 
which the opinion is applied are ambiguous. While the preface describes a circumstance 
in which a purchaser buys "all of the stock of the corporation" owning real property, the 
opinion instead applies the statute to a "sale of a controlling share of stock in a 
corporation." Informal Op. Utah Att'y Gen. 78-233 (1978), 1978 WL 25792. With 
respect to the latter, the opinion concludes that "a Utah Court would probably find" the 
sale of a controlling share "too far removed in nature from a real estate transaction." IdL 
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A careful reading of the opinion reveals that the assistant attorney general found the term 
"business opportunity" ambiguous only with respect to sales of less than all of a 
corporation's stock: 
There are too many variables involved in determining what 
constitutes a sale of control of a corporation. Less that [sic] 51% 
may be sufficient to control for certain purposes. To avoid any 
disputes which may arise from the nebulous definition of that term 
'control' it would be best to adopt a mechanical rule to the effect that 
only sales of assets of a business qualify as the sale of a 'business 
opportunity' under the statute. 
Thus, the opinion simply does not address a situation in which all of a 
corporation's stock is transferred. Because the purchase of 100% of a corporation's stock 
is not susceptible to the problems identified in the opinion, the opinion's rationale is fully 
compatible with an application of UREBA to such a transaction. 
Second, this Court owes no deference to the opinions. As the current Policy 
Manual of the Attorney General explains, "[cjourts have discretion to accord to opinions 
of the Attorney General whatever weight, if any, they determine appropriate." See 
Attorney General's Policy Manual § 5.1(D)(3), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1. See also Andresen v. Board of Regents, 58 S.W.3d 581, 588, n. 31 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2001) ("Attorney General opinions are not entitled to any more deference than that 
of any other competent attorney."); ATU Legislative Counsel v. Washington, 40 P.3d 656 
(Wash. 2002) ("[Tjhis court gives little deference to attorney general opinions on issues 
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of statutory construction.")- For these reasons, this Court should afford the opinion no 
deference.4 
D. Sachs' Contention That the Legislature Did Not Intend for UREBA to 
Cover Business Opportunities Involving Real Property Transacted 
Through Corporate Stock Is Without Foundation. 
Sachs further argues that the Court of Appeal's view of the legislative history of 
UREBA—that the legislature intended a sharp departure from the past when it deleted the 
definition of "business opportunity" from the statute—is accurate, despite conceding that 
the Court of Appeals relied on an incomplete legislative history record in reaching that 
decision (Sachs' Br. 24-27). 
Sachs repeats the Court of Appeals' argument that the legislature, by "governing] 
real estate and securities under different chapters of the Utah Code," intended to exempt 
all transactions involving securities from the real estate licensing statute. First, the Court 
of Appeals did not derive the legislature's supposed intention from the statutory language 
or from the legislative history but rather from the overall structure of Utah Code.5 In 
The Attorney General's office also recognizes that "a court may grant more deference to 
an agency's own interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing, or a regulation it 
has promulgated, than to the Attorney General's interpretation of the same statute or 
regulation rendered in response to a request from the agency." Id. As explained in 
Defendants' opening brief, and further argued below, this Court should defer to the Real 
Estate Commission's definition of the term "business opportunity," which represents the 
agency's considered interpretation of the term. 
5
 The Court of Appeals' decision over-emphasizes the importance of the legislature's 
creation of the Division of Real Estate in 1983. See Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, ffif 47-48. 
The division of some responsibilities between two agencies does not, without more, 
signal that the legislature intended to erect an impenetrable firewall between the 
administrative responsibilities of the two agencies. 
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doing so, the Court of Appeals ignored that the legislature, in the process of dividing 
enforcement of the securities laws and real estate licensing laws among two 
administrative agencies, expressly retained the term "business opportunity" in the 
definition of "real estate" in UREBA (and has done so through eight subsequent 
amendments) and retained the definition of the term "business opportunity" in the statute. 
Had the legislature intended the radical departure suggested by the Court of Appeals, the 
relevant legislation (or the sponsors thereof) would have expressly stated as much. 
Moreover, even the cases that Sachs relies upon do not draw a sharp distinction 
between securities and asset transactions. For example, Transamerica Case Reserve, Inc. 
v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990), addressed the corporate law 
doctrine of alter ego, which permits courts to disregard the corporate form in certain 
circumstances. Transamerica did not hold that a court can never treat a stock sale as the 
legal equivalent of a sale of assets under appropriate circumstances, such as when 
statutorily mandated. Likewise, Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 2004 UT App 
484, 105 P.3d 956, does not hold that a sale of stock and a sale of assets are distinctly 
different and actually discusses circumstances in which the two are considered legally 
equivalent.6 
6
 The Court of Appeals' reliance on Evans v. Prufrock, 757 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App. 
1988), is likewise misplaced. While Evans held that a sale of corporate stock was a "sale 
of personalty rather than realty," it did so under Texas5 real estate licensing statute, 
which, at the time Evans was decided, did not define "real estate" to include "business 
opportunities." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6573a, § 2(1) (1988). (Notably, however, even 
though Texas' statute did not textually encompass "business opportunities," the Texas 
courts had, by the time Evans was decided, construed the statute to apply to any 
(continued...) 
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Finally, the distinction drawn by Sachs and the Court of Appeals between stock 
and asset deals is irrelevant under UREBA. Recall that Sachs (1) claims a commission 
merely for "introducing] the parties who eventually consummated the transaction," and 
(2) admits that the "terms of the sale of UPCM 'were negotiated and concluded without 
[his] involvement"' (Sachs5 Br. 16-17). Because the critical inquiry under UREBA is 
whether the "person was duly licensed . . . at the time" of the "act" for which he claims a 
commission, the applicability of UREBA must be determined—as it must for all finder's 
agreements—without regard to the ultimate form of the transaction. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-18(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the "business opportunity at issue is [not] the 
purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock," as the Court of Appeals' erroneously held, but 
is rather just the purchase of UPCM (whose only asset of any significance was real estate 
and the entitlements to the same)—in a form to be determined later. Sachs, 2007 UT App 
169,1f40. 
Legislative History of 1985 Legislation 
Sachs' contention that the legislature intended to substantively amend UREBA in 
1985, when it deleted the definition of "business opportunity" from the statute, ignores 
the legislative history of those amendments. As both cases cited by Sachs, State v. Yates, 
(...continued) 
transaction that "primarily dealt with real estate," regardless of "the form which the 
principals' transaction ultimately takes." Evans, 757 S.W.2d at 805 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).) The Evans court primarily determined that the licensing statute did not 
apply because the only "real estate" involved in the transaction, which involved the sale 
of several restaurants, was a request that the seller "make its best effort to get extensions 
on its leases." Id. 
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834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), and Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), 
recognize, clarifying amendments are not presumed to have any substantive effect. For 
example, in Madsen, this Court followed the presumption that amendments are 
substantive because it found "no indication" that the "amendment was intended to clarify 
preexisting intention." 769 P.2d at 252, see also Yates, 834 P.2d at 601 ("[E]very 
amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification carries the rebuttable 
presumption that it is intended to change existing legal rights and liabilities." (emphasis 
added)). Here, both sponsors of the 1985 legislation expressly stated that it was intended 
merely to "clarify" the existing statutory language. 
Sachs attempts to downplay the effect of these statements by seizing upon Senator 
Overson's statement that the 1985 legislation was intended "clarify some things [the 
legislature] did back in 1983." Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 27, 1985) 
(Senate recording disc no. 124) (statements of Sen. Overson) (emphasis added by Sachs) 
(Exhibit G to Appellants' opening brief). From this slender reed, Sachs argues that 
portions of the 1985 amendments were intended to clarify the 1983 amendments, while 
others—namely the portion deleting the definition of "business opportunity—were 
intended to have substantive effect. The obvious problem with this convoluted argument 
is that no legislator ever addressed the provision deleting the "business opportunity" 
definition from UREBA during the floor debates. It is inconceivable that the legislators 
would discuss, in some detail, the clarifying portions of the legislation but not utter one 
word about the supposed substantive portions of the bill. Moreover, while Sachs 
speculates about the hidden meaning in Senator Overson's statement, Representative 
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Bradford, the primary sponsor of the 1985 legislation, House Bill 284, explained that it 
was intended to generally "clarify and clean up the existing statute." Floor Debate, 46th 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 22, 1985) (House audograph discs nos. 8 & 9) (statements of 
Rep. Bradford) (Exhibit F to Appellants' opening brief). Because all available legislative 
history "indicates]" that the 1985 "amendment was intended to clarify" the preexisting 
statute, the amendment is presumed not to have substantively modified UREBA. 
Madsen, 769 P.2d at 252. 
E. Sachs' Arguments Against Deferring to the Real Estate Commission's 
Definition of "Business Opportunity" Are Meritless. 
Sachs5 arguments against the Real Estate Commission's ("Commission") 
definition of the term "business opportunity" miss the mark. First, Sachs suggests that 
the definition of "business opportunity" contained in the Real Estate Commission's rules 
only applies to those rules—not to the statute—because the rule provides that the 
definitions are for the "[t]erms used in these rules." Utah Admin. Code r. 162-1-2(1.2). 
Sachs argument is untenable because the term "business opportunity" does not appear 
anywhere else in the Commission's rules, see generally id. rr. 162-1 to 162-210, and the 
rules were plainly implemented to enforce UREBA. Thus, the only term that the 
Commission could be construing is the statutory term. 
n 
Rule 162-1-2(1.2) also contains a definition for the term "branch manager," which 
appears in UREBA without a definition, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11(14), but does not 
otherwise appear in the Real Estate Commission's rules, see generally id. rr. 162-1 to 
162-210. 
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Sachs attempts to distinguish Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 
P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991), on its facts but fails to recognize that Morton is a seminal 
case in Utah administrative law that sets forth broadly applicable deference rules. 
Because this case does not involve "state agency action that determines the legal 
rights . . . of an identifiable person," the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") 
is not applicable. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l)(a). However, the pre-UAPA, common 
law rules discussed in Morton are still applicable. Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 585-87; 
Bhatia v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 581 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(Bench, J., concurring) (noting that the common law rules of deference discussed in 
Morton "are still applicable in non-UAPA cases"). 
Because the pre-UAPA common law rules of deference are still applicable in 
appropriate circumstances, and UAPA applies to all "agency action[s]," Sachs' attempt to 
limit deference to "proceedings before the commission" has no support (Sachs' Br. 33). 
Moreover, the common law deference rules apply, by their own terms, to an agency's 
"interpretations of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to 
administer," whether the court is reviewing the agency's action or not. Utah Dep't of 
Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983); see also, e.g., 
Morton Int'l, Inc., 814 P.2d at 586 (noting deference is available to an agency 
"construing statutory terms or applying statutory terms to the facts" (emphasis added)); 
Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1981). 
As Morton explains, under the pre-UAPA common law rules, courts defer to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute: (1) when "the agency, by virtue of its experience or 
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expertise, is in a better position than the courts" to construe the term, or (2) when the 
statute contains an "explicit or implicit grant of discretion." Morton Int'L Inc., 814 P.2d 
at 586, 588. The Commission's interpretation of the term "business opportunity" is owed 
deference under both tests. Sachs5 argument that "there is nothing to suggest that the 
Commission is in a better position than the Court to construe" the term "business 
opportunity" (Sachs' Br. 33) is ironic given that the 1985 legislation amending UREBA, 
which removed the statutory definition for the term "business opportunity," "came from 
the Real Estate Division," Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 22, 1985) 
(House audograph discs nos. 8 & 9) (statements of Rep. Bradford); Floor Debate, 46th 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 27, 1985) (Senate recording disc no. 124) (statements of Sen. 
Overson), for which the Commission is empowered to promulgate rules, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-5.5. Since the legislature adopted the agency's proposed legislation wholesale, 
this Court should grant the agency similar deference with respect to its interpretation of a 
statutory change made by that same legislation. 
F. The Licensing Statutes Applied in the Cases That Sachs Cites Are Less 
Similar to UREBA Than Those Applied in Defendants' Cases. 
While the "majority rule" is that a "sale of a business [that] involves any real 
estate component" requires a real estate license, cases applying the real estate licensing 
statutes of sister states have resolved the issue presented in this case variously. GDC 
Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Ransbottom Landfill 740 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
While the Court of Appeals noted that "statutory differences" often account for the 
different outcomes, the Court of Appeals followed case law from states whose statutes 
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are distinctly different than UREBA and rejected case law from states whose statutes 
more closely align with it. 
State licensing statutes are roughly divided into two camps: (1) those that define 
real estate to include "business opportunities/' and which further define the term 
"business opportunity," and (2) those that do not apply to "business opportunities" 
whatsoever.9 Perhaps not surprisingly, courts interpreting statutes in the first camp hold 
that assisting the sale of company with real property assets, even if accomplished by a 
sale of the corporation's stock, requires a real estate broker's license,10 whereas courts 
interpreting statutes in the second camp often do not.11 
Because UREBA expressly requires a license for transactions relating to "business 
opportunities involving real property," it is more analogous to the state statutes in the first 
camp. Unlike the statutes in the second camp—which do not apply to, or reference, 
8
 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-61-10l(2)(i); Idaho Code Ann. § 54-2004; Fla. Stat. 
§ 475.01(l)(a); Wash. Rev. Code. § 18.85.010. 
9
 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 34-27-1 to -11 (1975); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 17-35-101, 102 (1987) 
(renumbered and re-codified from Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-1302 (1947)); Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 112, § 87PP (1987); 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 455.201 (1990). 
10
 See, e.g., Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., 593 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1978); Lieffv. 
Medco Prof 1 Servs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Shochet Secur., 
Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (applying Florida 
law); Springer v. Rosauer, 641 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Schmitt v. Coad, 
604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 
11
 See, e.g., Abramson v. Gulf Coast Jewelry & Specialty Co., 445 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 
1971) (applying Alabama law); Frier v. Terry, 323 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1959); Turnpike 
Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 528 N.E.2d 1176 (Mass. 1988); Gruber v. Owens-
Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
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"business opportunities" at all—UREBA expressly defines real estate to include 
"business opportunities." As such, if this Court draws upon the case law of sister states, 
it should look to cases construing statutes that, like UREBA, expressly apply to "business 
opportunities." 
G. Sachs' Construction of "Business Opportunity" Renders the Term 
Superfluous. 
While Sachs agrees that this Court must "avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative," Hall v. Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, f 
15, 24 P.3d 958, he makes no effort to identify what types of transactions the term 
"business opportunity involving real property" encompasses. (Sachs' Br. 38.) Further, 
by defining the term negatively—claiming that the term does not include the sale of a 
company by a stock purchase—Sachs arrives at an interpretation that leaves the term 
without any residual meaning. 
Simple logic dictates that, if the Court of Appeals' decision stands, the term 
"business opportunities involving real property" has no substantive meaning. For 
example, the term is unnecessary to bring the transfer of a company by the sale of its real 
property assets within the ambit of the statute because other statutory provisions already 
apply to such transactions. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(12)(a), (c), (d). Additionally, it 
would be absurd to construe the term to not apply to the sale of an entire company, but 
then apply it to transactions amounting to something far less than the sale of an entire 
company, such as transactions involving a prospective company, a business franchise, or 
the subsidiaries, divisions, or business units of an existing company. In short, the Court 
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of Appeals' construction of the term leaves it a vestigial appendage in violation of basic 
rules of statutory construction. 
H. Sachs' Interpretation of UREBA Is Constitutionally Suspect. 
Sachs resorts to an artificial view of finders' agreements to avoid the constitutional 
infirmities of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute. According to Sachs, the 
due process concerns raised by the Court of Appeals' interpretation can be avoided if the 
finder simply agrees, at the outset, that he will only locate a buyer for the company's 
stock. (Sachs' Br. 40.) Sachs admits that, under this strained hypothetical, the finder's 
agreement is easily voided if the parties decide, after the finder has completed his task, to 
transfer the company as an asset sale instead. (Id.) 
Sachs' response not only fails to accord with common business practices, it 
contravenes the evidence of this case. As explained above, see Part IIA, supra, until his 
brief to this Court, Sachs only claimed that he was hired to find a buyer/purchaser for 
UPCM, not particularly a buyer for its stock. Typically, the decision whether to transfer 
a company by way of a stock sale versus an asset sale is not made until the final 
negotiations between the parties, and finders' agreements rarely, if ever, specify what 
form the transaction will ultimately assume. As such, the Court of Appeals' construction 
of UREBA injects constitutional infirmity into the vast majority of finders' agreements. 
Colorado v. Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. 1972) (holding that a statute violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses when the after-the-fact discretionary "action 
of a third party" is a "factor which determines whether guilt attaches"). 
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Under the Court of Appeals' construction, if an unlicensed finder seeks a 
commission after locating a buyer for a company, but the parties later transfer the 
company via an asset sale, rather than a stock sale, the after-the-fact actions of those 
parties cause the finder to violate UREBA's criminal provision. Utah Code Ann. §61-2-
17. As such, the Court of Appeals' construction must be avoided. See Thurnwald v. 
A.E., 2007 UT 38, «|f 42, 163 P.3d 623. 
Sachs5 contentions regarding purported violations of the "one subject" rule are 
also erroneous. Relying on a federal court's interpretation of Florida's Constitution in 
Shochet Securities, Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1987), Sachs 
argues that Defendants' interpretation of UREBA violates Article VI, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution, which provides that "no bill shall be passed containing more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." However, under the one-subject 
rule of Section 22, "[a]ll that is required is that the subject matter of the act be reasonably 
related to the title and that all parts of the act be reasonably related to each other." State 
v. Twitchell 333 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Utah 1959). Since Defendants' interpretation only 
applies UREBA to transactions involving businesses having real property assets, 
Defendants' interpretation maintains a reasonable relationship between the title and all 
parts of the statute and does not run afoul of the one-subject rule, even if the one-subject 
rule applied in Utah. 
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I. Sachs' Argument That UREBA Is a Penal Statute That Must Be 
Narrowly Interpreted Is Flawed. 
Sachs also argues that this Court must interpret UREBA in his favor because it is a 
penal statute. Even assuming UREBA is a penal statute, which it is not, see, e.g., Evelyn 
v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 130, 136 ("[A] statute is not penal simply because its 
violation is a Class [A] misdemeanor."), Utah has abolished the common law rule that 
penal statues are construed differently than other types of statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-106 ("The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this code, 
any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state.5'). 
J. Defendants5 Interpretation of UREBA Best Accords with Its Purpose. 
Sachs also argues that the Court of Appeals' interpretation better aligns with 
UREBA's purpose because the statute is purportedly not designed to protect sophisticated 
investors but only unsophisticated members of the public. (Sachs' Br. 46.) Both Sachs 
and the Court of Appeals' incorrectly assume that any deal that involves the sale of 
corporate stock necessarily involves sophisticated business entities, ignoring that limited 
liability companies and closely held corporations are often formed to operate small, 
family-owned businesses. 
While Sachs criticizes the Defendants' interpretation on the grounds that it is 
unclear how much real property a corporation must own to become a "business 
opportunity involving real property," Sachs fails to explain how the Court of Appeals' 
exception for "sophisticated" parties can be effectively administered, Le^ how much 
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"sophistication" is required and how it is measured. Even though this Court need not 
address Sachs' concern, since UPCM's only notable asset was its real property, Utah 
courts will be able to draw upon the wealth of existing case law, perhaps with guidance 
from this Court, when confronted with the question of how much real estate a company 
must own to constitute a "business opportunity involving real property." 
In sum, the "presumed purpose" of UREBA should not "override[] its literal 
terms." Andalex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, "nothing suggests that 'sophisticated' corporate entities should not be entitled 
to the same protections as the general public" under UREBA. Id. 
III. UTAH'S STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDES SACHS5 CLAIMS FOR A 
FINDER'S FEE 
Sachs nominally argues that the real estate broker provision of the statute of 
frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1), should not be read in pari materia with UREBA 
because "it is not cross-referenced to UREBA" (Sachs' Br. 48). Sachs does not, 
however, refute that the two statutes relate to the same class of persons (real estate 
iZ
 Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1980), on which Sachs and the Court of Appeals rely, is inapposite because this Court 
found that the "salesman involved in the transaction and employed by [the plaintiff] was 
a licensed real estate salesman." Likewise, American Rural Cellular v. Systems 
Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), applied long-standing 
common law exceptions to the contractor's licensing statute, not generally applicable 
exceptions. 
13
 Courts have adopted a variety of strategies for answering this question, from a "merely 
incidental" rule, see, e.g., Frier v. Terry, 323 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1959), to an 
apportionment rule, see, e.g., Kazmer-Standish Consultants v. Schoeffel Instruments 
Corp., 445 A.2d 1149 (N.J. 1982). 
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brokers) and things (compensation for selling real estate) and have the same basic 
purpose (the prevention of fraud by unscrupulous brokers). As such, the two statutes are 
considered in pari materia and should be "construed with reference to one another." Utah 
County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-112, Sachs argues that because his alleged 
agreement was "for the sale or purchase of a security" it "is enforceable whether or not 
there is a writing." Again, this flatly contradicts the Court of Appeals' own finding that 
the buyer that Sachs allegedly found, and not Defendants, "chose to structure its 
acquisition of UPCM as a stock rather than an asset purchase." Sachs, 2007 UT App 
169, f 51. If the decision to structure UPCM's purchase as a stock sale, as opposed to an 
asset sale, was not made until after Sachs performed under the purported agreement, then 
Sachs' purported contract was not "for the sale or purchase of a security" under Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-8-112. 
Instead, Sachs was allegedly employed to find a buyer/purchaser for UPCM, see 
Part IIA, supra, which was a business opportunity involving real property and, therefore, 
"real estate" under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). Thus, the purported agreement 
between Sachs and Defendants is void for want of a writing. Id. § 25-5-4. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. In addition, Appellants respectfully request that the 
Court remand this case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to enter an order 
affirming the Order and Judgment entered by the district court. 
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Exhibit 1 
5.10 Opinion Policy Undated 10-11-05 
Introduction. Utah law requires the Attorney General to "give the attorney general's opinion in 
writing and without fee to the Legislature or either house, and to any state officer, board, or 
commission, and to any county attorney or district attorney, when required, upon any question of 
law relating to their respective offices." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (7X2004) 
The Attolrney General and his or her staff will determine whether issues presented by agencies or 
officials authorized to request opinions should be addressed in a written, published opinion, or 
whether the request requires another form of legal advice. Either response fulfills the Attorney 
General's statutory responsibility to render opinions to public officials and the Executive Branch. 
In general, formal published opinions will be issued only when private legal advice is inadequate 
to resolve the issue, 
A. Appropriate subjects. As a guide, the following types of legal questions are appropriate 
subjects for an opinion: 
1. Questions relating to the legal duties of the political official requesting 
the opinion: and 
2. Questions that raise legal issues of wider interest or importance in a 
specific factual context. 
B. Inappropriate subjects. In general, the following types of issues are not appropriate 
subjects for an opinion: 
1. Issues that are hypothetical or abstract; 
2. Issues that are the subject of pending or likely litigation, or that resolve 
liability issues; 
3. Issues that are subject to a pending collective bargaining process: 
4. Issues that relate to the wisdom or judgment of the Legislature or of 
administrative or executive policies; 
5* Issues that involve construing federal statutory requirements; 
6. Issues concerning the constitutionality of enacted or proposed legislation; 
7. Issues that involve the interpretation of a charter, local law. ordinance or 
resolution; and 
8. Requests from or responses to agency clients that implicate attorney, 
client privilege or fall under the category of attorney-client work product, 
Most legal advice or opinions are provided in the ordinary course of legal representation and do 
not require a published Attorney General Opinion. 
C. Who may request. Formal Attorney General Opinions may be requested by the 
following: 
1. The Executive Branch, including the Governor's office and all executive 
branch agencies. The request must be in written form and must be received 
from the agency head or staff counsel. If the state agency is headed by a 
multi-member body, the request must be from the presiding officer, the 
executive director, or legal counsel. All executive branch requests for 
opinions should be routed through the Governor's office. 
2. The Legislative Branch, including the House, the Senate or the 
Management Committee. The request must be received from the President 
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, or the Management Committee, 
not from an individual member of the body. 
3. The Judicial Branch. The request must be received from the Office of 
the Court Administrator. 
4. County Attorneys or District Attorneys, As a general rule, the requesting 
officer will be required to give an opinion on the matter at the time the 
request is made. 
The statute authorizing the giving of opinions does not authorize the Attorney General to render 
opinions to municipal agencies or their attorneys. Additionally, the Attorney General is not 
permitted to render opinions at the request of members of the general public. 
D. Effect of Opinion. 
1. For the Attorney General. A formal opinion constitutes the 
Attorney General's carefully considered judgment as to what the 
law- requires in the circumstances presented by the request. Absent 
a change in law, factual circumstances or overriding public policy, 
the Attorney General ordinarily will be guided by prior published 
opinions and legal precedents. 
2. For the requesting official An opinion has no legal binding 
effect on the requesting officer. However, if an official disregards 
an opinion without a valid basis and if litigation results, the 
Attorney General may decline to represent the official with respect 
to some or all of the issues involved. In unusual circumstances, the 
Attorney General may decline to permit the official to obtain 
representation through a Special Assistant Attorney General. 
3. For the Couns. Courts have discretion to accord to opinions of 
the Attorney General whatever weight, if any, they determine 
appropriate. Opinions may be treated as persuasive. A court may 
grant more deference to an agency's own interpretation of a statute 
it is charged with enforcing, or a regulation it has promulgated, 
than to the Attorney General's interpretation of the same statute or 
regulation rendered in response to a request from the agency. 
fc\ Attorney General's Method of Processing Requests - All opinion requests are 
assigned to the appropriate Chief Deputy. Upon receipt, the Chief Deputy will 
determine if the request is an appropriate matter for an Attorney General Opinion: 
if so. it will be assigned an Attorney General Opinion number. The request will 
then be forwarded to the appropriate Division Chief to assign for processing. The 
receipt and assignment of the request will be acknowledged by the Chief Deputy 
to the requesting party. If the request is determined not to be a proper subject for 
an Attorney Genera] Opinion, the matter will be formally declined and a letter of 
notification of disposition will be given to the person requesting the opinion. 
F. Processing an Opinion 
1. Due date. The attorney assigned to render the opinion will be notified of 
the date an initial draft is due. If the attorney anticipates this deadline is 
not realistic, he or she bhould immediately notify the Chief Deputy of the 
need for an extension and a new completion date will be determined. 
2.Third-party input. In some instances, it may be appropriate to obtain 
input from third parties. In such event, the drafting attorney should seek 
prior approval from the Chief Deputy to request such input. Third-party 
input should be balanced on both sides of an issue. Whether this third-
party information is incorporated in the opinion is the decision of the 
drafting attorney in consultation with his or her Division Chief and the 
Chief Deputy. 
3. Working Drafts. A typed notation "Draft" and the date of the draft 
should appear on each draft. Working drafts shall not be distributed 
outside the Attorney General's Office without written authorization from 
the assigning Chief Deputy. 
4. Processing of Drafts. The proposed draft shall be submitted and e-
mailed to the Division Chief and then to the Chief Deputy for review. 
(a) The Division Chief may edit the opinion in consultation 
with the drafting attorney. The opinion is then forwarded to 
the Chief Deputy. 
(b) The Chief Deputy may edit the draft in consultation 
with the Division Chief and the drafting attorney. 
(c) After final editing, the Chief Deputy shall return the 
draft to the drafting attorney for preparation of the final 
draft and the narrative summary (see 5. below). 
(d) The drafting attorney shall submit the final draft to the 
Attorney General for final edit and signing. 
(e) A hard copy of the final opinion shall be filed in the 
Executive Division. 
(f) The Executive Division shall forward an electronic copy 
of the opinion to the office IT Analyst II for posting on the 
AG web site and distribution to vendors wishing to publish 
the opinion. 
5. Narrative Summary of Opinions. The drafting attorney shall prepare and 
include in the opinion a narrative summary. The narrative summary shall 
include at least the following information: 
(a) A short narrative of questions asked and answers given: 
(b) A discussion of how this opinion impacts the State 
agency: 
(c) A discussion of how this opinion impacts the public: 
and 
(d) A discussion of the important legal or public policy at 
issue. 
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